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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—- 000O000— 
JUNE TRAPP, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. : 
Case No. 900485 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
Priority No. 14(b) 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
—000O000— 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation's ("Salt Lake") Statement of Facts contains matters 
not relevant to this appeal. The sole issue presented is whether Salt Lake has a duty to maintain 
its sidewalks. Because Appellant June Trapp ("Mrs. Trapp") admits she has no special 
relationship with Salt Lake different from that of any other member of the public, the nature of 
the relationship between the parties is irrelevant. The only inquiry necessary to resolve this 
appeal is purely a legal inquiry: Does Utah impose on municipalities the nondelegable duty to 
maintain their sidewalks? 
In addition to being irrelevant, several of Salt Lake's fact statements are disputed, were 
disputed in Mrs. Trapp's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment1 and 
were not found to be facts by the trial court in ruling on the motion. First, Salt Lake claims that 
1
 R. 43-45. 
Mrs. Trapp "did not recall what happened at the time" of her fall.2 As noted in the "Disputed 
Facts" section of Mrs. Trapp's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Mrs. Trapp's deposition testimony is that she was walking east along 300 South, she stubbed the 
toes on her right foot and fell onto her face.3 Mrs. Trapp did recall what happened. 
Second, Salt Lake claims that Mrs. Trapp was never able to specify the exact area of her 
fall.4 As Mrs. Trapp noted in the "Disputed Facts" section of her Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment, this claim ignores that fact that pictures of the site showing 
its location in relation surrounding objects were provided to Salt Lake both before and at Mrs, 
Trapp's deposition. When counsel for Salt Lake showed the pictures to Mrs. Trapp at her 
deposition, she identified the location of her fall.5 
Finally, Salt Lake claims that there was no allegation or finding that it had actual notice 
of any sidewalk defect at the site of Mrs. Trapp's fall.6 This statement is correct. At the time 
Salt Lake filed its motion, however, discovery was continuing. The question of whether Salt 
Lake had notice of the defect was not relevant to the issues presented in Salt Lake's motion. 
Neither Salt Lake nor Mrs. Trapp mentioned the issue of notice and, appropriately, the trial 
2
 Brief of Appellee, Statement of Facts, Fact No. 3. 
3
 R. 43-45, 
4
 Brief of Appellee, Statement of Facts, Fact No. 5. 
5
 R. 43-45. 
6
 Brief of Appellee, Statement of Facts, Fact No. 6. 
2 
court made no finding concerning notice. In short, Salt Lake raises this point for the first time 
on appeal and calls it "undisputed." If for no other reason, the Court should ignore the claim 
because it was not made before the Trial Court.7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: SALT LAKE READS TOO MUCH INTO THE HOLDING OF 
FERREE V. STATE. 
Salt Lake argues that the public duty doctrine as applied in Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1989), and similar Utah case law adds a new element to negligence causes of action: the 
existence of a "special relationship." Salt Lake misreads the public duty doctrine cases. They 
do not represent a departure from long-held negligence principles. The first element of any 
negligence cause of action is the existence of a duty of reasonable care owed by defendant to 
plaintiff.8 Whether a duty is owed to a particular Plaintiff depends on whether the Plaintiff falls 
within the scope of Defendant's duty. The scope of duty is defined by what is reasonably 
foreseeable.9 Thus, at the core of the duty concept is foreseeability. 
The requirement of the public duty doctrine that a Plaintiff show a special duty owed to 
him as an individual is simply another way of saying that Plaintiff must show that his particular 
injury was foreseeable. The Court's discussion in Ferree is illustrative of the point. In 
7
 General Appliance Corp. v. Howe, Inc., 516 P.2d 346 (Utah 1973). 
8
 Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
9
 Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. ofN. America, 669 P.2d 410, 416 (Utah 1983). 
3 
distinguishing a case out of Alaska involving the same factual framework but different 
circumstances, the Ferree Court stated: 
Given those circumstances, the Court held that there was a threat of injury to a 
reasonably foreseeable potential victim by a clearly "dangerous" individual and 
that these facts gave rise to a duty of care on the part of the state and its 
employees. 
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152, citing Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 121 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 
1986). 
The facts of Ferree did not involve a reasonably foreseeable threat of injury: 
. . . [T]here is nothing to indicate that the officials were aware of anything more 
than a generalized possibility that Ferguson might cause difficulties because of his 
drug abuse. There was no reason to suspect that Ferguson was violent in general 
or would be violent toward a particular person or a particular type of person. 
Ferguson had no prior history of violence or of making threats, and corrections 
officials had no reason to know of any physical threat that Ferguson may have 
posed to the victim. Indeed, Ferguson and the victim were apparently unknown 
to each other. In short, officials had no duty of care to the victim apart from 
their general duty to the public at large. 
784 P.2d at 152. 
Thu~, the "special relationship" requirement found in the public duty doctrine cases is 
not a "requirement" in the strict sense of the word, but a shorthand way of saying that a public 
Defendant owes a particular Plaintiff a duty of care only if Defendant's conduct poses a 
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff. The starting point for the analysis is 
foreseeability. Given a foreseeable risk of harm, a duty of care exists regardless of the nature 
of the relationship between the parties. 
A Plaintiff can, therefore, establish the existence of a duty owed to her by a public 
4 
Defendant without establishing a "special relationship." A "special relationship" is not a 
requirement, as argued by Salt Lake, but a means of establishing duty. In the context of this 
case, Mrs. Trapp need not establish a foreseeable risk of harm or a special relationship. Years 
ago this Court determined as a matter of law that Salt Lake owes a duty to maintain its 
sidewalks for the benefit of Mrs. Trapp and all other members of the public. Therefore, in this 
case, the public duty doctrine has no application. 
POINT II: SALT LAKE MISCHARACTERIZES MRS, TRAPP'S 
ARGUMENTS BY TAKING THEM OUT OF CONTEXT. 
Salt Lake claims Mrs. Trapp interprets the sidewalk maintenance cases to create the 
"special relationship required in Ferree with every member of the public."10 This 
mischaracterization of Mrs. Trapp's arguments illustrates Salt Lake's misunderstanding of the 
holding in Ferree. The sidewalk cases do not create the special relationship referred to in 
Ferree; rather, these cases establish Salt Lake's duty to maintain as a matter of law, obviating 
the need to show a duty by some other means such as through a special relationship. Salt Lake 
simply misses the point. The special relationship idea is not a requirement in public negligence 
cases. It is simply one way of defining the limits of the public entity's duty. 
Salt Lake's argument that Mrs. Trapp's position, if adopted, "would gut the entire 
concept of individual special relationship on which Ferree is based,"11 ignores the very limited 
10
 Brief of Appellee at 8. 
11
 Id. 
5 
context of the present matter. This Court has determined as a matter of law that Salt Lake owes 
a duty of reasonable care in the context of sidewalk maintenance. There may be other areas in 
which duty is established as a matter of law, but generally the facts of a case govern the 
existence of a duty. The public duty doctrine applies in these cases. 
POINT III: SALT LAKE'S PUBLIC INTEREST ARGUMENTS ARE 
NOT PERSUASIVE IN THIS CONTEXT. 
Contrary to Salt Lake's claims, the public interest arguments supporting the Ferree 
decision do not apply in the area of sidewalk maintenance. The Ferree decision balances the 
public interest in the "practically indispensable" and "necessary programs of rehabilitating and 
paroling of prisoners" against the "occasional tragic failures" of such programs.12 Ferree 
rejects a broadly defined duty of care in the interest of operating parole and probation programs 
free from liability for their "uncertain success."13 
No such public interest claims can be made for sidewalk maintenance decisions. Simply 
put, there is no utility in failing to maintain a section of sidewalk other than Salt Lake saves the 
expense of maintenance. In contrast, the public interest is served by the state's parole and 
rehabilitation programs. Overcrowding in the prison system is alleviated and rehabilitated, 
useful citizens are returned to the work force. The failure to maintain a section of sidewalk and 
the act of releasing a prisoner are qualitatively different matters. 
12
 Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
13
 Id. 
6 
Even in the parole and rehabilitation context, the balance does not always tip in favor of 
the state. There is a line past which the interest of the individual transcends the interest of the 
public. Thus, in Ferree, the Court recognized that "when officials have good reason to believe 
that a particular person may be jeopardized by the release of a prisoner who has demonstrated 
capacity for violence, the result may be otherwise." Citing Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 
721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986), the Court recognized circumstances where "there was a threat of 
injury to a reasonably foreseeable potential victim by a clearly 'dangerous individual' giving 
'rise to a duty of care on the part of the state and its employees,,'" Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152. 
The public interest only carries so much weight. When the Plaintiff falls within the category 
of a reasonably foreseeable victim, public interest concerns are outweighed by the government's 
duty to the individual. 
In the sidewalk maintenance context, the dubious public interest of saving the expense 
of maintaining sidewalks is outweighed by the pervasive risk to every member of the public of 
the government's failure to maintain. The theoretical underpinnings of the government's duty 
to maintain its streets and sidewalks is that they are necessary for the public use at all times and 
under all conditions.14 Salt Lake's failure to maintain its sidewalks has potential to impact 
every member of the public everyday. In recognition of this widespread, foreseeable risk, the 
law in this state imposes on Salt Lake a duty to maintain. 
Mrs. Trapp is not suggesting that Salt Lake be an insurer of the persons using its 
14
 See Grantham v. City ofTopeka, 411 P.2d 634, 639 (Kans. 1966). 
7 
sidewalks. Contrary to Salt Lake's claim, Mrs» Trapp's reading of the law does not result in 
the imposition of "strict liability on the City in connection with injuries which may be connected 
with sidewalks."15 The sidewalk maintenance cases establish as a matter of law only the duty 
element of a negligence claim. Trapp must still prove a breach of that duty, causation and 
damages. 
In summary, the public interest concerns that guided the Court's decision in Ferree have 
no bearing in this context. Salt Lake argues that the public interest is best served by imposing 
a "special relationship" requirement in this kind of case, but neglects to mention that the result 
is absolute immunity. Under no circumstances can a Plaintiff in a case such as this show a 
"special relationship." If the public interest is best served by providing Salt Lake absolute 
immunity from sidewalk maintenance lawsuits, the job of providing the immunity must fall on 
the body responsible for representing the public, the legislature. 
POINT IV: THE "ACTUAL NOTICE" STANDARD URGED BY SALT 
LAKE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED. 
Admitting that application of the public duty doctrine in this context creates "a form of 
absolute immunity,"16 and claiming that the sidewalk maintenance cases make the government 
"absolutely liable for every sidewalk trip and fall,"17 Salt Lake urges the adoption of "a middle 
15
 Brief of Appellee at 10. 
16
 Brief of Appellee at 13. 
17
 Id. 
8 
ground between these two extremes . . . [to] provide a means for a plaintiff to recover."18 The 
"middle ground," according to Salt Lake, is an "actual notice" standard. That is, Salt Lake 
argues that its duty to maintain its sidewalks should arise only when it receives actual notice of 
a sidewalk defect. 
The argument is flawed in several respects. First, the "absolute immunity" versus 
"absolute liability" premise is incorrect. Application of the public duty doctrine in this context 
does create absolute immunity, but the sidewalk maintenance case law does not result in absolute 
liability. As noted, the sidewalk maintenance cases establish only one element of a negligence 
cause of action. Only the duty element is established as a matter of law. Salt Lake's liability 
ultimately depends on failure to meet its duty of maintaining its sidewalks, causation and 
damages. 
Second, Salt Lake argues that the best way to reconcile the public duty doctrine with the 
sidewalk maintenance cases "is within the context of analyzing the foreseeability of injury."19 
As previously discussed, this Court has already analyzed the public duty doctrine and the 
sidewalk maintenance cases within the conceptual framework of foreseeability. The public duty 
doctrine is ultimately based on the idea that, absent a special relationship, the governmental 
entity cannot reasonably foresee particular harm to a particular plaintiff. The sidewalk 
maintenance cases impose a nondelegable duty based on the obvious conclusion that the failure 
18
 Id. 
Id. at 14. 
to maintain a structure used by thousands of people everyday makes injury reasonably 
foreseeable. Salt Lake suggests nothing new when it argues that the issues should be analyzed 
based on the foreseeability of harm. 
Finally, Salt Lake's argument that actual notice of a defect be the "trigger" for 
foreseeability renders meaningless the concept of reasonable foreseeability. By definition, an 
actionable defect is foreseeable if it should be seen or known before it causes injury. A good 
synonym for the ability to foresee is anticipation. Thus, if it is reasonable to anticipate harm 
from a failure to maintain, a duty arises. 
Under Salt Lake's "actual notice" standard, foreseeability is a meaningless test because 
Salt Lake need not anticipate. As Salt Lake points out, "under this standard, the city's non-
delegable duty arises only when the city knows there is a problem."20 In essence, Salt Lake 
would have this Court dispose of the long established reasonable foreseeability test in favor of 
an absolute foreseeability test. Thus, only when harm is absolutely foreseeable as a result of 
injury caused by a sidewalk defect does Salt Lake have a duty to maintain. 
This conclusion is not warranted by the case law cited by Salt Lake. Gordon v. Provo 
City, 391 P.2d 430 (Utah 1964) does not adopt an "actual notice" standard. The Court in 
Gordon found no fault in the following jury instruction: 
[I]f any defect'. . . had been caused by anyone other than the defendant' 
and that the latter did not have actual notice thereof, or did not have a reasonable 
opportunity to remedy any such dangerous condition so caused, then they should 
20
 Id. at 15. 
10 
find for the defendant. 
391 P.2d at 433. The Gordon Court's finding that this jury instruction was adequate does not 
amount to an adoption of an "actual notice" standard. Even assuming it did, however, it 
provides no support for Salt Lake's position. First, Salt Lake must show that the defect in 
question was caused by someone other than Salt Lake. There is no evidence in the record 
concerning the cause of the defect. This simply was not at issue below. Second, as previously 
noted, the question of notice to Salt Lake was not at issue below. Trapp had done no discovery 
concerning notice at the time of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment and had no reason 
to object to the timing of the Motion for Summary Judgment based on a lack of discovery 
because notice was not an issue in the motion. Finally, there is no evidence concerning whether 
Salt Lake had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect prior to the injury to Mrs. Trapp. 
Again, this was not an issue before the Trial Court. 
Likewise, the cases cited by this Court in support of Gordon, and cited by Salt Lake 
provide no support for Salt Lake's position. For example, the issue of notice came up in 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951). In dismissing the claim that notice 
was required, the Court stated: 
While there is no evidence of any incident occurring which would have put 
the Appellant on notice that the terrazzo was slippery when wet, such evidence 
is not necessary to establish liability on the part of the Appellant. The latter was 
in the actual possession of the building and had a duty to search out defects in the 
premises in order that they be reasonably safe for the presence of business 
visitors. 
232P.2dat212. 
11 
In short, the Court's earlier decisions do not support the adoption of the "actual notice" 
standard urged by Salt Lake. The public duty doctrine and the sidewalk maintenance cases are 
based on the well established reasonable foreseeability standard. This is not the case to dispose 
of this traditional test for establishing duty. 
POINT V: THERE IS NO IMMUNITY FOR THE CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGED. 
A. Salt Lake Specifically Waived Immunity. 
The Trial Court based its decision on the issue of duty alone0 It made no finding 
concerning governmental immunity. For this reason, the Court should ignore Salt Lake's 
arguments concerning immunity. 
Assuming they are considered, however, the immunity issue is easily resolved by 
reference to Utah Code Anno. §63-30-8 (Utah 1965), which states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk . . . . 
The question presented by this lawsuit is whether Salt Lake property maintained the sidewalk 
pursuant to its affirmative duty to do so. It is apparent that Salt Lake enjoys no immunity from 
a suit presenting this claim. 
B. The Duty to Maintain a Sidewalk is Not Subject 
to "Discretionary Function" Immunity. 
Utah Code Anno. §63-30-8 waives immunity for an injury caused by a defective 
sidewalk. Section 63-30-10(l)(a) (1989) excepts from the general negligence waiver of 
immunity claims based on injury arising out the performance of a "discretionary function." In 
12 
other words, although immunity is generally waived for negligence, it is specifically retained 
when the negligence arises out of the exercise of a discretionary function. 
Almost 20 years ago this Court was faced with the issue of whether the discretionary 
function exception applies to the waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective sidewalks. 
In Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971), this Court stated the following with 
reference to §63-30-8, 9 and 10: 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sections 8 and 9 encompasses a much 
broader field of tort liability than merely negligent conduct of employees within 
the scope of their employment, the legislature could not have intended that 
Section 10, including its exceptions, should modify Section 8 and 9, even though 
it be conceded that the negligent conduct of an employee might be involved in an 
action for injuries caused by the creation or maintenance of a dangerous or 
defective condition. 
Sanford at 745. 
Although the Sanford decision dealt with a much broader issue than that present here, 
more recent pronouncements of this Court follow the reasoning in Sanford. In Gleave v0 Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988), the Court cited Sanford in 
noting that the waiver of immunity contained in §63-30-8 "is not subject to the 'discretionary 
function' exception in §63-30-10(1)." 749 P.2d at 667, n.6.21 
Even if the waiver of immunity for injuries caused by defective sidewalks is subject to 
the discretionary function exception, Salt Lake's actions in maintaining its sidewalks are not the 
21
 See Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Bigelow v. 
Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 54, n.3 (Utah 1980). 
13 
kind of discretionary functions contemplated by the statute. In Carroll v. State Road 
Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972), the Court held that discretionary functions are those 
requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy matters and do not include acts and decisions 
at the operational level — those everyday routine matters not requiring "evaluation of broad 
policy factors." 496 P.2d at 891. 
Whether Salt Lake spends its sidewalk maintenance dollars on 300 South or 700 East is 
not the kind of decision requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy matters. Instead, it 
is an operational level decision, a routine matter requiring nothing more than an evaluation of 
the state of repair of each sidewalk. Accordingly, even if the Sanford and Cleave cases are 
ignored, the discretionary function exception does not apply. 
DATED this 3o day of July, 1991. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON 
ERIC P. LEE 
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